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Institutional Depoliticisation  
and School Governance
Hollowing Out Local Politics in Schools?
Paola Mattei
ABSTRACT: The depoliticisation of school governance is associated with technocratic man-
agement, over-optimism about its performance, and fundamentally a misleading view of 
public accountability that rests on formal participatory mechanisms without effective power. 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the implications of the managerial revolution on ef-
facing the gap between school autonomy and political accountability at the level of the school 
organisation, and governing bodies. The analysis draws on comparative empirical data of 
changing governance patterns in secondary public schooling in England and France from the 
late 1980s. Some policy changes granting greater schools’ autonomy are strictly managerial 
in nature, but taken as a whole these reforms contribute to the depoliticisation of political 
decision making in schools and at the local level. 
KEYWORDS: Depoliticisation, Accountability, School governance, Local government, Man-
agerialism
Introduction
This article contributes to furthering our understanding of the policy terrain of 
the political depoliticisation of schools in England and France. It adds to the 
theoretical debate on the process of depoliticisation from the lenses of com-
parative public policy and governance. Intentionality and purposiveness are 
a central element in Peter Mair’s definition of depoliticisation (Mair, 2005a), 
which this article applies empirically to the case of education policy. It is viewed 
as a tactic used by political elites to distance themselves from the policy arena 
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(Flinders and Buller, 2006). As a policy strategy, depoliticisation entails the are-
na shifting of political responsibility from elected politicians, often represented 
on governing boards, in favour of school head teachers and managers who are 
put in charge. 
Depoliticisation entails the reassignment of tasks from political parties to a 
number of non-political and unelected bodies and figures. This article addresses 
the question of depoliticisation in a comparative perspective, through the lenses 
of changing governance in state schools, resulting from New Public Management 
and associated reforms to grant greater autonomy to head teachers and remove 
politicians from governing boards (Mattei, 2008). The balance of organisational 
autonomy and political accountability is at the core of public management re-
forms of schools in the last thirty years. The malaise of the current democratic 
process is that partisan politics is hollowed out and becomes less appealing and 
effective, while alternative forms of decision making, including judicialisation, 
expert decision-making, and a reliance on non-majoritarian institutions, win 
great prominence and acceptance (Jessop, 2017). In a lecture entitled The Future 
for Democracy: Politics in a Spectator Society, Jack Straw, former Leader of the 
British House of Commons, observed that: «some of the argument now is more 
shades of grey, more technocratic, more about means than ends – and this may 
appear to make politics less intrinsically exciting and political leadership harder» 
(Straw, 2006: 10). Straw implicitly suggested that the intrinsically non-vibrant 
and anonymous nature of the world of technocracy makes policies obscure to or-
dinary citizens and professionals. However, to the extent that there are difficulties 
in generating legitimacy and trust in public services, political leaders’ strategy of 
depoliticising decision-making may be the wrong remedy that increases, instead, 
the distance between citizens and politics (Hay, 2007). 
The comparison between England and France presents an opportunity to 
examine how these European countries with a similar desire on the part of their 
central and local governments to improve the efficiency of public schools, but 
with very different institutional arrangements and historical patterns of state 
traditions (Kaufmann, 2003), have responded differently over time to conver-
gent pressures of depoliticisation and neoliberalizing forces (Peck and Tickell, 
2002). The reorganisation of school administration and organisations at both 
central and sub-national levels of government in many countries has been asso-
ciated from the mid-80s with the shift from bureaucratic to managerial types of 
117
Institutional Depoliticisation and School Governance
es
sa
ys
 s
ec
tio
n 
1 
– 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
an
d 
(p
os
t)d
em
oc
ra
cy
Scuolademocratica n.s./2019
public organisations (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991). A new administrative par-
adigm is at the heart of the «managerial revolution» (Mattei, 2008). Its central 
myth is entrepreneurialism, associated with New Public Management (NPM) 
(Hood, 1991; Christiansen and Laegreid, 2001). Organisational legitimacy is 
no longer derived from input and the legality of procedures, but from output 
and performance. These reform programmes strengthen the discretion of man-
agers in relation to politicians, and transfer democratic representation to «civil 
society stakeholders» (Peters, 1996), and create structural buffer zone between 
politicians and policies (Flinders and Buller, 2006).
Depoliticisation is viewed in this article as one of the causes of the grow-
ing distance between institutions and civil society (De Nardis, 2017). Change 
does not only affect organisational structures, but it transforms the culture and 
normative values of liberal democracy. In the specific policy domain of educa-
tion, head teachers are encouraged to become ‘entrepreneurial’. Depoliticisa-
tion, thus, takes the form of a new type of governance for schools, in which the 
‘elected’ element of political decision-making, more frequently played out in 
Governing Boards of schools, is scrapped away. In this article, we focus on the 
depoliticisation of ‘politics’ developed by Jessop (2017), and associated with the 
deliberate tactic of shifting responsibility from non-political figures to manag-
ers in order to run services more efficiently, and in an economical manner and 
«ostensibly (but not genuinely) free from state interference» (Jessop, 2017: 9).
1. Theories of depoliticisation
The purpose of this article is to understand the relationship between the de-
politicisation of the political character of education and New Public Manage-
ment reforms, aimed at improving the efficiently and economical effectiveness 
of public services (Pollitt, 2003; Hood, 2001). The analysis draws on empirical 
data of decision-making in secondary public schooling in England and France 
from the early 1980s to date. By depoliticisation, the article focuses on the dis-
tancing of political elites from the internal governance of schools, in favour of 
managerial power by school head teachers. This deliberate strategy includes a set 
of complex shifting of power (De Nardis, 2017) in the context of the prevailing 
neoliberal paradigm in contemporary liberal democracies. 
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The problem of how to limit technocratic dominance is not new. Many years 
ago, Seymour Martin Lipset observed that the great struggle of the future would 
not be between capitalism and communism, but between democracy and bu-
reaucracy (Lipset, 1961). As Edward Page suggested (1991), professional poli-
ticians appointed to lead administrative organisations and political parties play 
an important role in preventing technocratic dominance. A balance then has to 
be struck between organisational autonomy, which presumably ensures more 
responsive and efficient local services by putting experts in charge, and political 
accountability, which makes these bodies accountable to ministers so that they 
can answer for their activities in Parliament and to the public more generally 
(Flinders and Buller, 2006; Burnham, 2001). The struggle between democracy 
and bureaucracy is also reflected in the scholarly debate about the regulatory state 
(Majone, 1996). Arguably, the predominance of managerial accountability and 
depoliticisation are ‘the price we pay’ for increasing the policy credibility of the 
European Commission, as sustained by Majone in his challenge to the relevance 
of traditional standards of legitimacy to European institutions (Majone, 1998). 
‘Managerial accountability’ mainly refers to financial accountability, as public 
managers have become responsible for devolved budgets to schools and hospi-
tals, and efficiency accountability, which refers to the process of generating value 
for money. Input and output oriented managerial types of accountability depend 
ultimately on measuring performance and assessing organisational efficiency.
As Dahl argued, the predominance of policy experts can be viewed as a 
‘guardianship’ rather than a democracy (1989). However, representative democ-
racy is impossible without the state bureaucracy, which is an instrument that 
serves a legitimately elected government and political elites (Schattschneider, 
1975). The process of policy-making has become obscure owing to its techno-
cratic complexity, even in the context of strong state traditions, as in Sweden 
(Lindvall and Rothstein, 2006). If output democracy starts to signal all its lim-
itations in generating public trust and political credit for political parties, is the 
‘price’ still worth paying? In any case, should a price be paid at all in first place 
for more efficient and economical public services? Has the democratic idea be-
come a vision of political order that it is impossible in the complex universe of 
policy-making? 
In contrast with some of the existing literature on the topic, this article anal-
yses depoliticisation as it unfolds within the policy domain of education, for 
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change is not viewed here merely as a formal and procedural ‘shift’ in deci-
sion-making from political to apolitical arenas, but as the substantive element 
of policy reforms. There has been a growing and rich body of literature on 
depoliticisation in the fields of political science and political sociology in re-
lation to European liberal democracies. As it happens, there is a hyperbole of 
multiple definitions provided by different scholars. It is possible to group these 
research debates according to scholars’ position in relation to the characters of 
depoliticisation, its predominant type, and the implications for democratic the-
ory and governance. Principal-agent theories point to the importance of formal 
controls, like partisan appointment at the head of executive agencies or budget 
setting, of elected politicians to limit ‘agency losses’. Studies on the politics 
of delegation have addressed the question of post-delegation political control 
and agency’s independence from partisan politics (Thatcher, 2005). The main 
concern of principal-agent theories is assessing the degree of agency loss, with 
relatively less emphasis on the wider implications of non-majoritarian institu-
tions for the democratic polity as a whole. The central idea that depoliticisation 
implies a ‘shift’ from one political policy arena to another technical one under-
pins much of the public policy debate in England, including the recent work of 
Burnham (2001), Buller and Flinders (2005), and Jessop (2017), among others. 
Burnham suggests that depoliticisation is mainly determined by exogenous 
economic circumstances linked to globalisation and politicians’ inability to con-
trol economic conditions. Depoliticisation is understood as «the process of plac-
ing at one remove the political character of decision-making» (Burnham, 2001: 
128). The prevailing form that it takes is rule-based economic management, 
departing from the old Keynesian, politicised and interventionist policies. 
Flinders and Buller’s work adopts a similar definition of depoliticisation, as an 
active ‘process’ of displacing political responsibility to different decision-mak-
ing arenas (e.g. ‘arena shifting’). Hence, depoliticisation primarily responds to 
a strategy of blame avoidance, for politicians seek to avoid responsibility or 
unpopular decisions. One of the main shortcomings of this body of literature is 
that it is not comparative and its application is limited to majoritarian political 
institutions and governments. This limitation is compensated, however, by the 
development of a comprehensive classification of different types and tactics of 
depoliticisation which are useful analytical tools. Depoliticisation takes three 
different elements, according to Flinders and Buller. First, institutional depolit-
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icisation is the most widespread tactic whereby the public official enjoys a high 
degree of managerial discretion. Second, rule-based depoliticisation relates to 
policies that constraint politicians’ autonomy in some fields of government ac-
tivities. Third, preference-shaping depoliticisation is a tactic used by politicians 
to create a new political discourse and rhetorical reality. This article focuses on 
the first type, namely ‘institutional depoliticisation’. 
As far as the implications of depoliticisation for democracy are concerned, 
arena shifting, it is argued, does not necessarily imply a challenge to political 
legitimacy. The newly transformed government bodies and agencies to which 
politicians shift responsibility to for decision-making remain intrinsically polit-
ically legitimated institutions. Hence, depoliticisation is a misnomer for arena 
shifting (Buller and Flinders, 2005). This strand of the literature is less con-
cerned for the implications of depoliticisation on the growing distance between 
citizens and institutions. 
The main problem with this existing scholarship on depoliticisation of pol-
icy-making in England is that it somewhat minimises the wider implications 
of depoliticisation for representative democracy and the representative role of 
political parties and political elites. In this respect, it differs fundamentally from 
the scholarly work by Peter Mair on depoliticisation. He sustains that depo-
liticisation is a symptom of a profound democratic malaise, with far reaching 
implications for parliamentary democracies and electoral accountability. Peter 
Mair attributes the origins of depoliticisation to the failings of political parties 
by a process of mutual withdrawal (Mair, 2005b: 8). Parties are failing in two 
ways: first, in their capacity to engage citizens, and secondly in their represent-
ative function, as their political leaders retreat in institutions and public office 
holding. As far as the latter is concerned, Mair sustains that over time the dual 
roles of parties, namely representative and procedural, became separated from 
one another (ibidem: 22). He seems to suggest that the ensuing depoliticisation 
is a vicious cycle leading to the erosion of popular democratic control and elec-
toral accountability (ibidem: 23). It leads to putting under stress the traditional 
and conventional models of representation and party democracy. Thus, depo-
liticisation is not only conceptualised as a type of polity, politics or policymak-
ing, but it becomes a widespread and fundamentally non-democratic mode of 
governance, so as to «hollow out partisan politics» (Mair, 2005a: 25). Empirical 
findings presented in this article and elsewhere (Mattei, 2012) suggest that this 
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argument would not be fundamentally challenged by the thesis of a reassertion 
of politics (Pierre, 1995; Halligan, 1997) and re-politicisation (Jessop, 2017). 
On one hand, politicians may try to adapt to the changed circumstances of 
managerial technocratic dominance, and diminishing political control of deci-
sion-making processes, by using more informal mechanisms, or by resuscitating 
the old practice of patronage and party appointment of the higher echelons of 
the bureaucracy. On the other hand, it is also important though to account for 
the impact of new organisational values, which have emerged as a result of New 
Public Management, on the reassertion of political control. The proposed arti-
cle contributes to open up the question of whether parties will be capable of re-
asserting ‘politics’ within state institutions, or whether the process of hollowing 
out will continue relentlessly. Schools are not empty black boxes implementing 
decisions made by national governments, and they are not simply instrumental 
to political strategies. Entrepreneurialism has made schools themselves policy 
entrepreneurs of change. Their managers have gained a dominant voice and 
have cultivated allies outside political parties in the civil society. This political 
space of policymaking has been firmly occupied and depoliticised. 
Hence, schools are no longer instrumental to political parties, but institu-
tional actors with their own autonomous power. Welfare organisations do often 
adapt to their institutional context, but they often play an active role in shaping 
those contexts (Parsons, 1956). It remains to be seen how parties can influence 
the institutionalised rules pertaining to the externally legitimated managerial 
dominant paradigm. Earlier work has suggested that parties find it increasingly 
difficult to control welfare bureaucracies because the organisational legitima-
cy of hospitals and schools have changed and hybrid forms of accountability 
permeate public services delivery (Mattei and Benish, forthcoming). Welfare 
organisations show considerable ability to survive, precisely because they incor-
porate powerful myths and «institutionalised rules» (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Thus, organisational success depends not only on matching the demands of 
internal efficiency, but also on conformity to the prevailing neoliberal norma-
tive paradigms (Peck and Tickell, 2002). External institutionalised rules are a 
legitimate source of organisational structure, which is not only the result of apo-
litical engineering. Entrepreneurialism functions, then, as a new paradigm for 
schools, and its deeply rooted institutionalisation in representative democracies 
implies that there may be limited discretion in the future for any political party 
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to repoliticise the process on the basis of the traditional representative role of 
political parties. 
2. Governance changes in schools in England and France: Divergent 
approaches to local politics
2.1. England
The British education system, in comparison to the French one, has traditional-
ly been decentralised. Until the late 1980s, publicly funded schools in England 
were under the control of local education authorities (a part of local councils, 
run by democratically elected members). Some schools had a religious charac-
ter: their capital costs were partly-funded by the church and the schools had 
more autonomy. There was no national curriculum and the assessment system 
comprised public examinations (set by private examination boards) taken at 
the end of compulsory education and at the end of upper secondary education. 
Policy developments since the late 1980s, however, have marked a steady and 
radical departure from the central role played by local politics in the running 
of schools. The 1988 Education Act assigned to schools’ governing bodies the 
strategic planning of schools and the role of accountability overseer of schools. 
Most recent reforms have consolidated the autonomy of schools in England and 
the declining role of local government (DfES, 2004). 
The idea of leaving schools to teachers in a ‘secret garden of the curricu-
lum’ has been under attack, at least since David Eccles, the Conservative Secre-
tary of State in the 1960s, introduced that memorable description of teachers’ 
autonomy (Timmins, 1995). The perception that ‘something had to be done’ 
by the mid-1970s was strengthened by the economic crisis of 1976 and the 
public spending cuts that followed. There was a widespread fear that the U.K. 
did not have an education system able to sustain economic competitiveness 
in the world economy. In 1976, the then Labor Party Prime Minister, James 
Callaghan, aimed to launch a ‘great debate on education’ in his famous speech 
at Ruskin College, Oxford, in which he directly challenged and criticized the 
teaching profession, as responsible for the perceived ‘crisis’ in education. He 
advocated more power to parents as a countermeasure. Callaghan’s speech pre-
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figured the confrontational assault that characterized Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher’s educational policies in the 1980s. Her and subsequent Conservative 
governments adopted three landmark reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, with the 
objective of creating an educational system based on ‘choice and diversity’, and 
significantly diminish the role of local government favoring instead schools’ 
autonomy and self-governing.
The key and lasting changes of the Thatcher period were introduced by the 
1988 Education Reform Act. This reform introduced a new system of funding. 
Schools were to receive so much per pupil enrolled – i.e., ‘money followed the 
pupil’. The central government included a sum in local authorities’ allocations 
depending on the number of school children enrolled. This was intended to 
be spent on schools and the requirement to do so became absolute by 2004. 
Local councils could add to this central funding as they wished but they were 
required to allocate the schools budget between schools on a weighted per capita 
basis approved by the central authority in England. If a school did not attract as 
many pupils as in the previous year because its exam results had been poor, or 
for other reasons, it lost money (Glennerster, 2009).
Secondary schools in England and Wales were given the option to opt out 
from the control of the local education authorities (LEAs) and to spend the 
funds received from the central government as they wished. But even local au-
thority’s managed schools received devolved budgets over which their governing 
bodies, advised by the head teacher, had complete control. These governing 
bodies consisted of parents elected by all the parents with children at the school, 
elected members of staff, and other local community members. 
Governing bodies in England are based on the stakeholder model with var-
ious groups being represented, namely staff, parents, and lay people from the 
community. They typically meet three to seven times a year, and they do vary 
in size. Formal responsibilities of governing bodies have changed over time and 
their role has been most recently specified by the inspectorate Ofsted in their 
2013 Handbook (Ofsted, 2013). Strategic planning, accountability, perfor-
mance, and overall responsibility for standards are the main responsibilities of 
governing bodies. Local government does no longer need to offer support to 
them, and the role of local political decision-making has been declining steadily. 
In an attempt to empower ‘consumers’ (as parents and students were de-
fined), the 1992 reform later transformed the role and composition of the gov-
Paola Mattei
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erning bodies of schools. Parents acquired a major role as members of governing 
bodies, together with other lay people (DfES, 1992). Beforehand, local govern-
ment councillors, who claimed to be experts on educational matters, used to be 
members of the school governing bodies. The composition of governing bodies 
also changed to allow greater representation of parents (in addition to school 
staff, other members of the community, including members of political parties). 
The view was that «scrutiny by parents, employers and the local community at 
large will be intense, interested and increasingly informed, to the benefit of our 
children» (Department for Education, 1992: 5).
The head teacher is responsible for the school’s leadership and management; 
governors are expected to challenge and support the school, provide construc-
tive advice and act as a ‘critical friend’. They are not expected to be involved 
in the detail of the day-to-day operational management of the school. Legally, 
school governing bodies have responsibility for staffing and financial manage-
ment (setting the school’s budget, appointing staff and setting their pay in line 
with the national School Teachers Pay and Conditions Document. Governing 
bodies (whose most influential member is the head teacher) are accountable for 
how that money is spent via a method of common financial reporting, set down 
in statute. The relationship between head teachers and governors is also formally 
one of accountability of the former to the latter. However, in practice parents 
and lay members may not have the expertise and the skills, the inclination, and 
sometimes the information, to challenge the head teacher’s budgetary decisions.
Overall, the accountability regime in English schools has moved away from 
one of predominantly professional accountability towards a combination of 
different types of accountability – professional, hierarchical, and market-driv-
en types (Mattei, 2012). These are inextricably linked together. The focus on 
test results, as the main content of new types of accountability, is consistent 
with both hierarchical and market accountability at all levels – school, local 
authority, central government. Data from national tests are available to parents, 
so providing an account to parents as consumers under the market accounta-
bility regime. The same indicators are the focus of targets by the Treasury, by 
government departments and schools. In this changed policy context, teachers 
have lost ground in favour of other actors, such as head teachers and parents. 
From the late 1990s to date schools’ autonomy ahs been consolidated and lo-
cal government does no longer support governing bodies. Governors call the 
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head teacher to account, and local political decision-making has been made 
fairly irrelevant. As we will see in the next section on France, the local level of 
government remains highly influential in French schools, not only in terms of 
representation but also executive decision-making. 
2.2. France
In 2004, a landmark reform decentralised the governance of primary and sec-
ondary schools in France (Loi n. 2004-809). Local authorities became respon-
sible for staffing, budgeting, and strategic planning of schools. Centralisation, 
uniformity and neo-corporatism, however, were traditionally identified as the 
fundamental traits of the French educational system (Archer, 1979). The central 
government until the mid-1980s was responsible for the organisation of the 
educational services throughout the country, the regulation of national exam-
inations, the definition of the content of the national curriculum, the training 
and recruitment of teachers and the control of teaching methods. Not much 
was left to the sub-national level of government or individual schools as far as 
educational policymaking and leadership was concerned.
The French Education Ministry is organised along regional lines. A rector is 
the minister’s direct representative in the provinces. The rectorate is a complex 
organisational structure with major service delivery responsibilities. The rector-
ates represent the field services of the Education Ministry. Reforms in the 1990s 
have introduced globalised budgets and cost centres status for rectorates, which 
have conferred greater financial flexibility and autonomy in setting targets and 
allocating resources. However, as Cole and Jones show in their findings (2005: 
575), there are obstacles to change, including the continued dependency of 
local services from the Finance Ministry and the opposition of trade unions, 
which are openly suspicious of moves to delegate greater responsibility to the 
field services. The modern école was built upon a dual power structure: the 
State set the rules for the organisation, and funding of the school and the teach-
er profession was largely autonomous with regards to their pedagogic activity. 
The long traditions of educational centralisation and the independence of the 
professions have been mutually reinforcing and have made the system closed to 
external public influences (notably parents and civil society).
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It was only in the midst of the economic crisis of the mid-1980s and the 
challenges posed by globalisation that a new legal entity and organisational level 
was created between the State and the teaching profession. The établissement 
public local d’enseignement (EPLE or school organization) was a new organisa-
tion designed to reorganise the State education system along the lines of a new 
decentralised state management. The reform, announced in 1975, and only en-
acted in 1985 conferred upon the schools explicit responsibilities and a new au-
tonomy for the first time in the history of the French Republic. Schools became 
legal entities (EPLE) in their own rights with administrative, financial and ped-
agogical powers. Most importantly, the creation of the EPLE has triggered three 
processes (Demailly, 1993). First, it modified the relationship between teachers 
and head teachers by conferring upon the latter an unprecedented power to 
influence teachers’ pedagogical decisions. Second, by promoting the autonomy 
of schools, EPLE created a demand for transparency and users’ accountability 
about actions taken at that level. Third, the creation of the EPLE enhanced a 
process of professionalization of head teachers, encouraging them to develop 
new skills and to move beyond a merely bureaucratic role towards a new lead-
ership role. The principal in the colleges and proviseur in the lycées gained new 
powers and responsibilities in the 1990s. 
The governance of French secondary schools is based on consensus and ne-
gotiation between a plurality of actors and interests represented in the Govern-
ing Board of secondary schools in France, so-called Conseil d’Administration 
(CA). It is morally composed of thirty members belonging to three different 
constituencies in equal parts (so-called represéntation tripartite): one-third are 
appointed members of the regional and local government and the municipal-
ities, or the inter-communal organisations, plus the head teacher, his deputy, 
and the financial director; one-third are elected representatives of the teaching 
profession, non-teaching school staff, and trade unions’ representatives; and 
one-third are elected representatives of students and parents. The exact number 
of each group depends on the size of the school. Differently from the English 
case, local government is fully represented in each school’s CA. 
Unlike the English case, in French schools the CA is the main decision mak-
ing body at the school level, and not merely a consultative body or a scrutinising 
body. The CA acts as an executive board taking key decisions associated with the 
budget and strategic planning of the school. It takes legally binding decisions 
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and is supported by the regional and local administration in doing so. Its func-
tioning and responsibilities are all regulated by national law (Articles L421-4 
and Articles R421-20 and R421-24 of the code de l’education). In practice, the 
key players within the CA are teachers and the head teachers, with other groups 
being rather silent or less influential. A recent report by the French National In-
spectorate General highlighted the critical issue of promoting the engagement 
of parents in the governing bodies, currently dominated by other actors (Inspec-
tion générale de l’Education nationale, 2006). Moreover, the same report has 
noted the excessively bureaucratic and rule-founded governance of governing 
bodies, and called for streamlining the administrative process. 
Conclusions
New Public Management reforms were based in the 1980s on a rather mis-
leading view of state management and any promise in the late 1990s associated 
with the reassertion of political control over technocratic decision-making and 
administrative fragmentation was based on a rather simplistic view of political 
decision-making and governance systems. This article showed that the changes 
in schools’ governance reflect the shift in the 1990s from technocratic govern-
ment to depoliticised modes of state management (Burhman, 2001). The com-
parative analysis of this study emphasised that depoliticisation of political deci-
sion-making in schools have affected English schools much more than French 
ones, especially as far as the role of local government and local political govern-
ance is concerned. Any claims of the re-assertion of politics and re-politicisation 
needs to be assessed against the profound restructuring that has occurred since 
the late 1990s in the internal redefinition of political and administrative respon-
sibilities of governing bodies in schools. 
The cases of French and English schools have shed light on national variations 
of institutional depoliticisation across countries. Thus, we cannot conclude that 
the depoliticisation of school governance has affected educational systems in the 
same way. There are marked variations that this article highlighted. In France, 
governing bodies of public schools are mainly political-administrative bodies 
with strong executive responsibilities for the strategic management and budg-
eting of the school. They are quite large assemblies, usually composed of 30 
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members, with members coming from the regional or municipal government 
in equal numbers as representatives of teachers and parents. Local government 
is a powerful actor in France, and the 2004 reforms have consolidated this role. 
On the contrary, the representation of parents in governing boards of schools 
is given a much greater weight in England. Local councilors in the past were 
members of governing bodies of English schools, but this has changed radically 
in the 1980s with the Conservative reforms discussed in this article, and with 
the steady and unabated consolidation of schools’ autonomy. 
In April 2019, French teachers demonstrated against the reforms initiat-
ed by the Education Minister Blanquer. They were advocating less ‘politics’ in 
education and lamenting that politicians were getting involved in pedagogical 
choices. It seemed a world apart from the past intimate relationship that exist-
ed between teachers unions and political parties in France. As De Nardis has 
acutely observed in his work, depoliticisation has serious implications for con-
temporary political and economic systems. It seems to be a deliberate tactic to 
instigate public opposition against institutional politicisation in favor of depo-
liticized modes of governance. Further empirical research is needed to advance 
our understanding of the growing distance between disillusioned citizens and 
political institutions, and how depoliticized state management is the cause and 
not the solution of this. Depoliticisation may have contributed, significantly, 
to the growing distance between state institutions of service delivery and their 
users. 
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